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 Handley 2 
On October 23rd, 1956 a group of 200,000 protesters, mostly students, marched to 
the parliament building in Hungary and removed a statue of Stalin that had been erected 
several years earlier. The protesters than marched to the Radio Budapest building in order 
to broadcast their demands against the Soviet rule that had taken power in Hungary. 
Upon arriving to the Radio Budapest building the protesters were met by the AVH, a 
Soviet police force created to keep order throughout occupied Eastern European nations. 
Amidst the chaos tear gas was thrown into the crowd of protesters, and the AVH opened 
fire. Hungarian soldiers refused orders by the Communist leaders to help put down the 
revolt, and instead joined the side of their fellow countrymen. What ensued was twelve 
days of violence in which the Communist leaders fled Hungary until Soviet tanks were 
able to regain control. But what led to one of the most violent phases of the Cold War 
that fall day in Hungary? After almost six years why did the citizens finally revolt against 
their oppressive government? While many factors played key roles into the revolution in 
Hungary, the messages broadcast by Radio Free Europe convinced the citizens to 
violently rise against the communist leaders, suggesting help from the West would come. 
 The revolt against communism in 1956 was against the regime that had taken over 
just ten years earlier. After WWII, the Soviet military occupied Hungary, gradually 
replacing the freely elected government with appointed Communist leaders. In 1948 
Matyas Rakosi was appointed leader of Hungary and the Stalinist-Communism takeover 
was complete. During Rakosi’s reign, the citizens of Hungary saw a drastic decrease in 
economic success and almost the entire elimination of human rights and freedoms. The 
methods of Stalinism included the collectivization of agriculture and rapid 
industrialization, which cost many farmers money and the entire country food, virtually 
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eliminated all due process of law, and massive political purges against those who 
disagreed with the parties policies. However, in March of 1953 Stalin died, and the future 
of Stalin’s brand of Communism in Eastern Europe was in question. Imre Nagy, a 
popular Communist politician, was elected Prime Minister and conditions immediately 
began improving. Nagy was known as a Socialist Communist, one who believed in 
human rights and equality. During his first reign as Prime Minister, Hungarians saw an 
immediate loosening up of the authoritarian Communism that had existed. But by 1955 
Nagy and his Socialist Democratic ideals had fallen out of favor by the new Soviet 
politicians led by Khrushchev, and he was removed from office. Under Erno Gero the 
new Prime Minister, the authoritarian Communist government was back in power. In 
February of 1956, newly appointed leader of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, gave 
a speech to the members of his congress denouncing Stalin and his methods of leadership. 
He denounced Stalin’s abuse of purges during the Second World War, and accused the 
former leader of taking advantage of Communism for personal gain. For the first time 
since the Soviet Revolution of 1917 Communist officials were questioning their own 
methods. After the removal of Nagy, who had introduced freedom from a Communist 
leader that Hungarians weren’t used to, along with the questioning of politics and policies 
of the Soviet Union from Khrushchev, Hungarian citizens began to question the role of 
Stalinism in their country. The unrest from these events helped lead to the Revolution 
that took place in October of 1956. 
 Radio Free Europe had been broadcasting into Hungary since its creation in 1949. 
RFE was created in part by the United States CIA along with other nations in Western 
Europe who feared the spread of Communism. It was created to broadcast unbiased news 
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from the democratic nations, and to inspire the citizens of Eastern Europe to protest 
against their Communist governments. The initial goal of Radio Free Europe was to 
simply broadcast news from the West into the Satellite countries where information was 
filtered and edited by the Communist governments. The goals of RFE were clear from the 
beginning: to bring down Soviet control in Eastern Europe. When President Eisenhower 
was elected president in 1953 the use of Radio Free Europe changed. Frank Winser was 
an American Secret Service Agent during WWII, and served as a spy in Berlin and 
Vienna in the early years after the war. The United States government put him in charge 
of a propaganda department in which over 3,000 people were on payroll in an effort to 
eliminate all support for Communism in Eastern Europe.1 The death of Stalin in 1953 left 
the future of Stalinism in Eastern Europe in question, and the United States viewed it as 
their prime chance to bring down Soviet control in the region. Winser believed that the 
most effective way to spread the “voice of liberty” into Eastern Europe would involve 
RFE. Within 18 months of Eisenhower’s election in 1953 Winser had the station 
broadcasting anti-communist propaganda. The early propaganda group was the initial 
foundation of the CIA, with Winser becoming known as one of the founding fathers.2
 Broadcasts should emphasize Western determination to undermine Communist 
 regimes… The station’s purpose is to contribute to the liberation of the nations 
 imprisoned behind the Iron Curtain by maintaining their morale and stimulating in 
 them a spirit of non-cooperation with the Soviet-Dominated regimes.
 
After Winser took charge of RFE, a new handbook informed the employees of RFE what 
was expected while on the air: 
3
 
 
                                               
 1Victor Sebestyen, Twelve Days: The Story of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 2006), 58. 
 2 Ibid. 
 3Sebestyen, 59.   
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While RFE earned the reputation as being truthful in the first four years of its existence, it 
was very clear that the intentions of the station were changed to create unrest in the 
Satellite countries. 
  While Social and governmental issues in Hungary sparked unrest, the use of 
Radio Free Europe as a propaganda tool directly led to the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. 
The radio reports were used to influence the citizens listening to take action, and in some 
cases to take up arms against the communist governments in charge. While it quickly 
became clear that Western nations had no intentions to intervene, they were still willing 
to offer tactical plans over the air.  The Hungarians were just another piece of the chess 
board for the United States and the Soviet Union, but for the Hungarians themselves, 
their entire lives were affected for the worse from the whole ordeal. 
 Historians have viewed the uprising from several different vantage points since 
the revolution in 1956. Different historians state different events that drove the 
Hungarians to revolt against the Soviets, but don’t discuss why the Hungarians believed 
they could win. A rebellious group of students wouldn’t seem to stand a chance against a 
trained and organized world wide power like the Soviet army, and yet the students took 
arms anyway. Why have historians ignored the reasons that drove the revolution from a 
desire to an actual event? The values of those authors who have looked at the revolution 
will be vital to understanding this. The Hungarian Revolution came during the Cold War, 
a time where people viewed the world issues as good versus evil, Capitalism versus 
Communism, the United States versus the Soviet Union. 
 Many of the early Historians who wrote about the Hungarian Revolution had been 
actively involved in the fighting. Those historians from Hungary have been unwilling to 
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blame themselves for what took place, and instead have simply focused on the misdeeds 
and horrendous actions taken by the Soviets to combat the uprising. English speaking 
historians who fought during the Revolution are even less credible. These historians were 
outsiders from either Western Europe or the United States, and entered Hungary to 
defend Capitalism and the freedom of democracy. Due to their involvement in the 
revolution as well as their relationship to the West, their views are skewed when it comes 
to the role of propaganda from the West. Later historians focused on the Hungarian 
Revolution and its relationship to the Cold War. While the involvement of the revolution 
as a part of the Cold War is extremely important, many of these historians ignore it as an 
individual event, and thus downplay the causes of the revolution and the impact of Radio 
Free Europe. Many of these historians have also created articles and books portraying the 
Hungarians as martyrs for democracy, and concluded that the Soviet Union was solely to 
blame for the violent episode that took place. Not until recently have historians began to 
study the causes of the revolution and the possible role that RFE had in causing the 
students to take arms against the Soviet Union. 
One of the early historians involved in the fighting was Michael Korda. Korda 
was a student at Oxford when the revolution began, and he and several of his friends 
traveled to Budapest to help with medicine supplies as well as assisting in the fight 
against Soviet soldiers. Fifty years after he took part in the revolution, Korda wrote 
Journey to a Revolution, a personal memoir and history of the Hungarian Revolution. 
Korda viewed the revolution as a tipping point, even stating that the “collapse of the 
Soviet Union itself could be traced back to the consequences of the uprising in the streets 
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of Budapest.”4
 The book is an excellent source to help paint the picture of the chaos that existed 
in the fall of 1956, but it doesn’t present the events from both sides. The book is 
enjoyable in that it is the first hand account of a man who was actively involved in the 
uprising, but as an outsider from England volunteering to enter Hungary, it is impossible 
to take his point of view without questioning its authenticity. The reason Korda went to 
Hungary was to fight for democracy against the Communist government, so it is 
understandable that he is going to be unwilling to blame his own government and its push 
for democracy for what took place. Korda downplays the role of RFE broadcasts in 
stating that:  
 Korda, writing fifty years after the revolution, obviously has strong 
personal beliefs that the revolution was one of the greatest moments in history, as he was 
involved first hand. But the fact that he was involved, as he puts it, on the side of the 
“Independent, Democratic” Hungarians skews his views. He certainly believes that the 
Soviets were completely to blame for the violent revolution.  
 For years Radio Free Europe, broadcasting from Munich, had been urging the 
 people of the “captive nations” to rise against the Russians, and promising help 
 from the West when they did so. Much as these broadcasts irritated communist 
 governments, it is doubtful that anyone else took them all that seriously.5
 
 
Rather, Korda believes that what took place was a random uprising against a tyrant 
regime. While it was a “revolution against eleven years of alien, heavy-handed, 
unyielding Russian domination and occupation,”6 he also saw it as “spontaneous, popular, 
and embraced.”7
                                               
 4Michael Korda, Journey to a Revolution. (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2006), 2. 
 His explanation is vague and unclear; was it a planned out aggression 
against the Soviet government, or was it a spontaneous event that boiled over? While it is 
 5 Korda, 103. 
 6 Ibid, xiv. 
 7 Ibid. 
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interesting to hear first person accounts from Korda, it is impossible to completely rely 
on everything he has to share. As a Westerner entering into the war zone that was 
Hungary, he simply saw it as good versus evil. In no way is he willing to look beyond the 
Soviet Union to blame the unimaginable violence that took place those twelve days in 
1956. 
 A later historian named Phyllis Schlafly wrote an article titled “1956 Hungarian 
Revolution Lit the Lamp of Freedom” for the journal Human Events in October of 2006. 
The article Schlafly presents portrays the Hungarians and those involved in the fighting 
as martyrs for democracy, solely blaming the Soviet Union for the atrocities that took 
place. The first sentence states: “The revolution started Oct. 23, 1956, as a peaceful 
student protest in Budapest, but after Russian soldiers fired on the students, it escalated 
into a full-scale revolution against Soviet tyranny,”8 immediately indicating the direction 
that Schlafly’s article is going to take. Schlafly never once mentions RFE or the 
propaganda sponsored by the United States as a reason for the unthinkable violence that 
ensued, but rather makes statements accusing the Soviet troops as being “trigger happy.”9 
Schlafly even goes as far as to compare the Hungarians to the Founding Fathers of the 
United States, stating: “They fought in the tradition of Patrick Henry: ‘Give me liberty or 
give me death.’”10
 While Phyllis Schlafly spends a considerable amount of time discussing the 
revolution itself, the purpose of her article becomes clear when she ties it back to the 
impact it had on the Cold War: 
 
                                               
 8 Phyllis Schlafly, “1956 Hungarian Revolution Lit the Lamp of Freedom,” Human Events 62, no. 
36 (October 23rd, 2006): 15. 
 9 Ibid. 
 10 Ibid. 
 Handley 9 
  … the valor of the Hungarians who fought in the streets gave courage to other 
 countries. The dream was rekindled all over Eastern Europe that the day would 
 come when they, too, might have the opportunity to throw off their captors. The 
 effect of the Hungarian revolution in the U.S. was dramatic: It changed the debate 
 about communism and punctured the Communist lie of peaceful coexistence.11
 
 
Schlafly also claims that the revolution of 1956 “started the unraveling of Soviet 
communism that finally came to pass in 1991.”12
 Despite the lack of historians that have covered the role of RFE on the Hungarian 
Revolution, it is imperative to study the effects that the propaganda barrages had on 
Hungarians to fully understand the event. To examine how the broadcasts of Radio Free 
Europe influenced the Hungarian citizens to fight against the Soviet soldiers, this essay is 
going to analyze transcripts from RFE, conversations amongst high ranking political 
officials from the United State, Hungary and the Soviet Union, interviews with 
Hungarian Refugees, military surveys conducted by the United States and declassified 
CIA documents. Through all of these documents it is clear that the United States 
understood the impact that RFE had in Hungary, and how the propaganda could 
eventually lead to a violent revolt. Despite knowing the risks of a diminished reputation 
 While the article is written with 
celebrated passion, it is almost difficult for any true historian to read. The wonderfully 
glorious light that the Hungarians are portrayed through is reminiscent to those early 
historians who were actively involved in the fighting. It solely puts the blame for the 
thousands of deaths on the Soviet Union, and sets the revolution on such a high pedestal 
that one reading it would think it was the single most important event to ever occur in the 
twentieth century. While it does give insight to a small faction of interpretations, the 
entire article has to be viewed with extreme skepticism.   
                                               
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
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and potential for uprising, the United States continued their media barrage on all of the 
countries in Eastern Europe. 
 One of the first big decisions that Radio Free Europe had to make was over the 
release of Khrushchev’s famous “Secret Speech,” given in February of 1956 in which the 
new Soviet leader openly admitted to his parliament that Stalin had committed heinous 
crimes of mass murders and unthinkable violence against the citizens who opposed the 
Communist regime. In May of 1956 the United States uncovered two copies that were 
deemed valid, and thus had to decide what action, if any, to take with them. Ray S. Cline, 
an official in the CIA, proposed the release of the full text be made available to the public, 
believing that it would create support and proof for the worldwide slander and the foreign 
policies the United States had taken against the Soviet Union since the end of World War 
II.13 Frank Winser rejected this plan, and instead implemented the Winser-Angelton act 
that would slowly leak portions of the document in an effort to exploit the speech rather 
than just presenting it.14
 There were several reasons for the Winser-Angelton act to be used rather than just 
the all out release of the speech. The most notable was due to the covert plan called Red 
Sox/Red Cap, a project that included the training of refugees from the Satellite Nations 
for combat inside Eastern Europe. The Trainees were deemed not ready for battle, and 
Winser wanted to wait until the units were combat ready to begin releasing the speech.
 
15
                                               
 13 Arch Puddington, Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and 
Radio Liberty. (Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2000), 91. 
 
His reasoning was simple, he knew that the release of the speech would create unrest 
inside those nations who would be listening, and the potential for a violent revolution 
 14 Ibid. 
 15 Ibid. 
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existed. Until the exiled units were capable of combat with the Soviet soldiers, they 
would hold off.  
 It was slowly becoming clear to all those involved in RFE what kind of impact the 
broadcasts could have inside the Soviet bloc. In early 1956 the CIA admitted that they 
knew the impact of the propaganda broadcasts could be violent, and at that point in time 
they were unable to assist militarily. As it became clear that the end result was more than 
likely going to be violent, the CIA knew it might be asked to back up their broadcast with 
military help. Lawrence de Neufville, who began working for RFE in 1954, asked his 
bosses in Munich: 
 What happens if a man in a raincoat comes here and says, “We’ve been listening 
 to all this stuff and we’re ready to start a revolution”? They discussed it in a 
 special board meeting and they didn’t know what to do… They were all busy 
 thinking they were doing good and nobody was doing any real plotting. And then 
 the events caught up with them.16
 
 
Many involved with the United States government feared the same reaction by the 
Hungarians could occur. To protect the credibility of Radio Free Europe and in a sense 
the reputation of the United States if an incident did take place, the CIA found it 
necessary for the United States and Washington to be able to preserve plausible 
deniability.17 Walter Hixson, a historian working for RFE, explained that “RFE had to 
foster the illusion of being a genuine private radio station”18
 Despite knowing the risks, the propaganda barrage continued to be ordered by the 
United States government and Western European powers. One aspect of the propaganda 
 in order to maintain 
credibility to those listening in Eastern Europe. 
                                               
 16 Frances Stonor Saunders, Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War. (London: 
Granta, 1999), 140. 
 17 Sebestyen, 58. 
 18 Ibid. 
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operation in Hungary was the use balloons and leaflets with messages to the people. In 
Hungary and other Eastern European nations, millions of leaflets were dropped into the 
country by balloons presenting statements and propaganda from the West, in particular 
the United States. The leaflets presented “inspirational” messages. An example of the 
leaflets is: 
 Czechs and Slovaks, know this: The regime is weaker than you think. Power lies 
 with the people, and the people stand opposed. With unity and courage, organize 
 your strength. Down with the collective. Insist on workers’ rights today. Demand 
 concessions-tomorrow, Freedom.19
 
 
At the same time RFE announced on the air, “The Soviet Union is growing weaker. Only 
those will survive who detach themselves from the Communist boat in time… 
Everywhere in the Free World your friends are with you…. All power to the people.”20
 The United States Army created a survey in January of 1956 titled “Hungary: 
Resistance Activities and Potentials that analyzed the potential for Special Forces 
operations in Hungary. In the report, army officials admit that: 
 
Virtually the same effort was done in Hungary under Operation Focus calling for action 
to be taken against the Communist regime. 
 Dissidence and resistance potential appear to be strongest among peasants, whose 
 continuing opposition has substantially contributed to the failure of the regime’s 
 agricultural program; youth, whose cynicism and apathy has caused growing 
 concern in Communist circles; industrial workers, whose disillusionment is 
 widespread; and the Roman Catholic clergy, the majority of whom have not 
 joined the regime-inspired “peace priest” movement….21
 
 
The survey openly admits that there was legitimate unrest amongst the working class and 
youth, yet the fliers were aimed toward those with anger and hatred toward the Soviet 
                                               
 19Puddington, 64. 
 20 Ibid. 
 21 Study Prepared for U.S Army Intelligence, Hungary: Resistance Activities and Potentials, 
January 1956 in The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents, ed. Csaba Bekes, Malcolm 
Byrne, Janos Rainer, (Budapest, New York: CEU Press, 2002), 88,89. 
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regime. The survey doesn’t say whether they believed violent uprising was a possibility 
amongst these groups, but they do show that they know who to target with the 
propaganda fliers. Whether it was intentional or not, the messages sent in stirred up 
support for the anti-communist movement that would eventually become violent. 
 The incidents’ surrounding the balloon and leaflet drops concerned officials in 
Washington regarding RFE and United States reputations. In Czechoslovakia, a load of 
several thousand leaflets were accidentally dropped onto the field of a sporting event in 
the middle of the action.22 In Prague the balloons were blamed for a plane crash that 
killed twenty two people on January 18, 1956.23
 The President recalled that both he and I had been rather allergic to this project 
 and doubted whether the results would justify the inconvenience involved. The 
 President said he thought the operation should be suspended. I agreed, but said I 
 thought we should handle it so it would not look as though we had been caught 
 with jam on our fingers.
 Upon hearing the events in which the 
leaflets were blamed for, an official to President Eisenhower was quoted as saying: 
24
 
 
Throughout the propaganda barrage, the United States attempted to do whatever it could 
to keep it’s relationship with Radio Free Europe a secret from the public, for fear that it 
would discredit the reports broadcast into Eastern European nations. 
 As the year went on RFE continued to broadcast propaganda programs designed 
to undermine the regime in Hungary, and dissidence amongst the civilians in Hungary 
grew even larger. On October 23rd  it all boiled over when a rally was planned by the 
students of Hungary to protest against the Soviet Union. The Communist leader of 
Hungary, Erno Gero, met with his delegation that morning to discuss the planned protests. 
                                               
 22 Puddington, 111. 
 23 Statement by Joseph Grew to the Secretary General of the United Nations, March 19, 1956. 
 24 Johanna Granville. “Caught with Jam on Our Fingers: Radio Free Europe and the Hungarian 
Revolution of 1956,” Diplomatic History 29, no. 5 (November 2005) 815. 
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From his aides, two vastly different opinions were presented. Jozsef Revai and Gyorgy 
Marosan warned Gero that a threat of a revolution was possible, and even likely. The 
only possible solution the two men saw was to cancel the demonstrations and to have 
security fire on anyone who defied the ban not to protest.25 Lajos Acs, the senior Political 
Committee member had a differing opinion. He believed that there was no way a revolt 
was imminent, and instead they should try to smooth things over with the protesters by 
allowing Imre Nagy back into the government.26
 On October 23rd at 3:00 in the afternoon the protests began, with marchers from 
the east and west marching in unison. As the marches went through the city they quickly 
gained support by other citizens. As factory workers and working class joined the 
demonstrations, the onlookers increased their encouragement. One section of the protests 
went to Kossuth Square in front of Parliament, and called for Nagy.
 The men compromised, coming up with 
the solution to ban the demonstrations, but not to use deadly force.  
27
                                               
 25 Csaba Bekes, Malcolm Byrne, Janos M. Rainer, The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in 
Documents, (Budapest, New York: CEU Press, 2002), 191. 
 As chants of “Imre 
Nagy into the government!” rang out, another set of protesters gathered in front of the 
Radio station near a statue of Stalin. After several hours of standoff between the 
protesters and the AVH protecting the station, violence broke out. At 8:00 p.m. a speech 
by Gero denounced the protests angering the crowed of listeners. An hour later at 9:00 
p.m. the first shot rang out from the radio station, which was then under siege by the 
crowd. After an evening of fighting, the protesters finally took control of the building, 
and the start of the revolution had occurred.  
 26 Ibid. 
 27 Ibid, 192. 
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 As the fighting began between the Soviet troops and the Hungarian citizens, 
Washington found itself in the middle of a crisis in which it needed to make a decision on 
what action to take. Some officials from the United States argued that the advantages of 
intervening were outweighed by the potential of disrupting the political status quo of the 
region, which had been running smoothly since 1945.28 The other argument that many 
senior officials shared was the feeling that the United States had an obligation to follow 
through with the rhetoric it had been pumping into Eastern Europe, and it was the United 
States duty to live up to the expectations of the worldwide public which supported the 
Hungarians battle against the Soviet Union.29
We are thinking of the possibility of bringing it to the [UN]SC [United Nations 
Security Council]. From a political standpoint, the Sec. is worried that it will be 
said that here are the great moments and when they came and these fellows were 
ready to stand up and die, we were caught napping and doing nothing.
 The debate continued when on October 24, 
1956 John Foster Dulles called the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot 
Lodge, with Washington’s concerns. 
30
 
 
From this message comes a sense that rather than obtain bad press, the United States 
government was willing to allow the Hungarians hopeless battle for freedom continue 
with innocent bloodshed. Officials were well aware that the rhetoric spread into the 
region by the United States and RFE was a huge inspiration to those Freedom Fighters 
squaring off with the Soviet Union, but the decision was still made to put U.S. repute 
over innocent lives. 
                                               
 28 Ibid, 202. 
 29 Ibid, 203. 
 30 Memorandum of Conversation between John Foster Dulles and U.S. Ambassador to the United 
Nations Henry Cabot Lodge, October 24, 1956 in The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in 
Documents, ed. Csaba Bekes, Malcolm Byrne and Janos M. Rainer (Budapest, New York: CEU Press, 
2001), 228. 
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 The Communist officials of the Hungarian government were also faced with 
important decisions on how to end the uprising of the civilians. While the Soviet Union 
promised that reinforcements were on the way, officials in Hungary were fearful about 
how much support the revolution had garnished throughout the nation. Reports were 
flooding in to the leaders that rural citizens were taking arms and joining the fight, at 
which point decided that a desperate act was needed to suppress the fighting. On October 
28, 1956 the Hungarian Communist party members met to discuss what to do. Among the 
thirteen on hand were Janos Kadar, Jozsef Kobol, Erno Gero and Imre Nagy, the highest 
ranking Communist officials in Hungary. Kadar began the meeting by stating, “We have 
to find a way to get the people who took part in the fighting to lay down their arms 
without regarding them [all] as counterrevolutionaries.”31
 One member of the Communist party involved in the meeting, simply referred to 
as Comrade Mikoyan, suggested “It has to be said more clearly that there were mistakes 
in the old leadership…. If we want to be at the leading edge of the workers’ movement, 
we must demand that they end the fighting.”
 The leaders understood that the 
best way to get the Freedom Fighters to put down their arms was by making concessions. 
However, they were still unwilling to give in to the demands made by those initial 
protests, but by softening the punishment to those fighting there was a general hope 
amongst the Communist leaders that a ceasefire could be reached. 
32
                                               
 31 HWP CC Political Committee Meeting, October 28, 1956 in The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A 
History in Documents, ed. Csaba Bekes, Malcolm Byrne and Janos M. Rainer (Budapest, New York: CEU 
Press, 2002), 253. 
 The first decision was to have Imre Nagy 
once again become the Prime Minister. The hope was to start negotiations between the 
new government lead by Imre Nagy and the fighters. By telling them that concessions 
 32 Ibid, 255. 
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were going to be made, and that their uprising was no longer viewed by the Soviet Union 
as an uprising, but rather a reaction to past misdeeds, immediate acts of violence would 
cease to exist; At the very least until Soviet troops arrived. For the first time since the end 
of WWII, the Soviet led Communist leaders began to discuss the process of 
desalinization in Hungary.  
 On October 28, 1956 at 5:25 p.m. new Prime Minister Imre Nagy gave a radio 
announcement to the Hungarian citizens about the formation of a new government. His 
opening statement was right on cue with the meeting between officials earlier in the day;  
 During the course of the past week bloody events took place with tragic rapidity. 
 The fatal consequences of the terrible mistakes and crimes of these past 10 years 
 unfold before us in these painful events which we are witnessing and in which we 
 are participating.33
 
 
The speech that followed accused the citizens of criminal behavior, but only as a reaction 
to the crimes committed by the previous government. Despite the Soviet Union’s 
warnings against it, Nagy also included a section of his speech discussing Soviet 
abandonment of Hungary: 
 The Hungarian Government has come to an agreement with the Soviet 
 Government that the Soviet forces shall withdraw immediately from Budapest and 
 that simultaneously with the formation of our new Army they shall evacuate the 
 city’s territory.34
 
 
Nagy hoped that by announcing on air that a deal had been reached, the Soviet Union 
would be forced to abandon Hungary and Nagy’s new government could begin 
recuperating the country. Unfortunately, the impression was given to those citizens 
listening that the Hungarians triumphant battle against the Soviet regime had been 
                                               
 33 Radio Message from Imre Nagy Announcing the Formation of a New Government, October 28, 
1956, 5:25 p.m. in The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents, ed. Csaba Bekes, Malcolm 
Byrne and Janos M. Rainer (Budapest, New York: CEU Press, 2002),284. 
 34 Ibid, 285. 
 Handley 18 
successful, and that the Soviet’s exit of Hungary was official. A friend of Nagy, Tibor 
Meray, later analyzed the problem that took place after Nagy gave his speech:  
 It sometimes happens in history that a whole country becomes the victim of an 
 optical illusion. That was what happened in Hungary. Nagy’s announcement of 
 the ceasefire order, which he linked this time to a promise that the Soviet troops 
 would leave the capital, spread drunken joy throughout the country. The little 
 people of Hungary, who had fought with such indomitable courage, now thought 
 they had triumphed over the Soviet Union, not only morally but also militarily.35
 
 
 The same day that Imre Nagy and the rest of the Communist leaders were 
attempting to create some sort of stability and peace, Radio Free Europe was 
undermining their efforts. A broadcast on October 28 informed its listener’s military 
tactics that were found to be successful against superior enemies. The report began with 
carefully edited statements that made it seem as though military support from the West, 
mainly the United States, was imminent.  
 Three days ago we said that every day, every hour gained by resistance is worthy 
 the sacrifice, lessens the risk. This statement of ours is emphasized by the meeting 
 of the U.N’s Security council, called together for tonight… The calling together 
 of the Security Council would have shrinked to a purely formal demonstration if 
 Imre Nagy and his companions would have liquidated the revolutionary 
 movement within two days. 36
 
 
The impression given was that a decision on what military action the U.N. was going to 
take was being discussed that evening. However, the meeting the broadcast was referring 
to was the previously mentioned meeting in which the members of the UN were 
attempting to figure out a way to separate their names from RFE in light of the revolution 
in order to maintain their reputations The encouragement for the Hungarian soldiers to 
fight on was ignited by the belief that they were not in the battle alone. They weren’t 
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taking part in a revolution, but rather they had just ignited a war with the Soviet Union in 
which the rest of the Free World was about to take part in. 
 To further confuse those Hungarians who were listening to the messages 
broadcast on RFE, the report warned that the Soviet Union was sending reinforcements to 
put down the uprising. The report added, “According to pessimists these forces will snap 
up the freedom fighters in no time. We on the other hand say: let us not be scared of these 
numbers indicated as overpowering forces.”37 The reporter went on to tell a story from 
World War II when the Nazis were marching through South-Eastern Europe, where only 
500 Serbian fighters “went into action by attaching themselves closely to the marching 
German division, popping up on the sides, in front and the rear and by keeping close 
contact with each other.”38
 It is by these means and not by a supremacy of arms and numbers that they 
 succeeded to stop in a decisive place an enemy army which marched towards a 
 decisive task, causing grave losses without suffering substantial losses 
 themselves.
 The program wrapped up by saying, 
39
 
 
Following the reports broadcast to the Hungarians it became clear to those outside of the 
Satellite Nations that RFE was sending false reports to those listening. The call for action 
undermined all efforts for peace that surely would have prevented the revolution from 
continuing, resulting in unfathomable loss of life. 
 Following that program, RFE came back on the air with what later became known 
as the famous “Molotov Cocktail” speech. The announcer began the program by 
announcing that “we have asked our fellow worker Gyula Patko to report about his own 
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 39 Ibid, 287. 
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experiences, in order to illustrate the possibilities of partisan warfare against tanks.”40
One of these methods is in the first place the bottle filled with gas which was, at 
the time, jokingly called “Molotov cocktail.” All one needed for this was a wine 
bottle of one liter filled with gasoline to which we added a few crumbs of yellow 
phosphor and then sealed it tightly…. The moment the bottle broke, the phosphor 
set the gasoline immediately on fire and the enormous sucking effect of the 
powerful motor did then the rest. The motor caught fire and the tank became 
immovable. The crew was forced to leave the tank and our firearms done the 
rest.
 To 
the citizens listening, the impression was still being made that these programs were 
sponsored by Western Europe and the United States, and that they were giving military 
advice to hold off the tanks until backup could arrive. The actual military advice began 
shortly after, with exact instructions for the Freedom Fighters on how to combat the 
Soviet tanks. The special guest told stories of how he defeated tanks during his time as 
commander during WWII, and suggested that those listening do the same. 
41
 
 
The Hungarians were hearing military tactics provided by the U.S., but they were again 
being fed more propaganda that was undermining all efforts to end the violence at once. 
The West had no intentions of intervening, nor had they ever seriously considered the 
proposition to do so. 
 After the United States and other Western coalition forces failed to respond to the 
cries for help by Hungarian citizens, the Soviet troops entered Hungary on November 4th 
to put down the revolution. After the twelve days of death and destruction, around 4,000 
Hungarians were killed, over 700 Soviet troops were dead and thousands more were 
wounded. Over 200,000 Hungarians were forced to flee their homes and search for 
shelter from neighboring nations. After the Soviet Union regained power in Hungary, 
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13,000 Hungarians were imprisoned and about 350 more were executed for their 
involvement in the Revolution. Janos Kadar became the Prime Minister, and despite his 
attempts at creating  a worker-peasant government, the Soviet Union kept a tight grasp on 
the politics in the country.  
Hungarians were misled by the messages broadcast over Radio Free Europe in the 
months prior to the revolution and through the uprising’s entirety. As the students 
gathered against the Soviet opposition, messages and speeches rang in their ears that aid 
would come from the west. One of those involved in the fighting was an 18 year old male 
student in October 1956. After being actively involved in the uprising against the 
Communists, he was forced to abandon his home in order to save his life after the Soviets 
restored order. The young man, who preferred to remain anonymous, stated in an 
interview in 1959, just three years after fleeing his home in Hungary, “Since Stalin’s 
death…. All knew then that something will happen. However they did not expect to do 
things themselves but the thought of aid and the solution to come from the West.”42
 We knew that they would intervene, but we trusted in the West to help us. Ten 
 years of propaganda has convinced us of this. Had they not intervened, there 
 would have been no revolution and peaceful readjustment with Moscow would 
 have been possible.
  The 
unnamed young man went on to reveal the concern, or lack there of, of Soviet 
intervention:  
43
 
 
The young man referred to Radio Free Europe as the citizen’s main source of news from 
the West during occupation. The broadcasts that were streamed over Radio Free Europe 
implied that all the Hungarians had to do was stand up against the Soviet regime and the 
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West would take care of the rest. As the rest of the world looked on, it was devastatingly 
clear that the Hungarians had no chance of defeating the superior Soviet army. However, 
the Hungarians acknowledged that they would not be able to defeat the Soviets as well, 
but were convinced the United States would aid them. 
 Other Hungarians had the same sentiment about the messages they perceived to 
be the truth. Another young man helped at the radio station in Budapest as the revolution 
broke out. He was actually working inside the Radio Budapest building on October 23rd, 
the day protesters and AVO officers clashed to mark the start of the revolution. The 
anonymous young man cited the same confusion that many others had from what was 
heard on the air from RFE. He also made more serious claims, suggesting that the 
broadcasts did more than ignite the nationalistic spirit and pride in the citizens, but 
actually directly led to the deaths of innocent Hungarians. 
 … I have to tell you something about Radio Free Europe. It is a fact that RFE 
 served a useful purpose. It encouraged us during these 12 years but RFE also 
 made statements which cost many Hungarian lives. On my way to Austria I met a 
 Hungarian officer who told me that RFE’s famous declaration, “wait another day, 
 fight another day, and help will come,” cost him 850 of his men.44
 
 
 The direct claim puts into question what the goals of the United States and the rest 
of the Western nations that supported RFE were. The creators of RFE, the CIA in 
particular, and the Hungarian citizens had the initial belief that RFE was in place to 
broadcast unbiased news from democratic nations, but the reports from the area seem to 
suggest otherwise. The broadcasts advanced from news updates to political speeches, and 
anti-communist propaganda intertwined within it all. Because the propaganda had 
advanced to such an extent, many Hungarians saw what they were doing as more than a 
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revolution, but rather the beginning of a war between the United States and the Soviet 
Union.  
 The question of how such a disaster could have occurred began to be discussed 
worldwide. Questions about Radio Free Europe’s involvement in the revolution began to 
be discussed. On December 5, 1956 a policy review of RFE during the revolution was 
conducted. An internal investigation was done by the RFE political adviser, William 
Griffith, in which several conclusions were made. The first conclusion was that “There 
were relatively few real policy violations.”45 Griffith then goes into detail of each of the 
policy violations that were committed by the broadcasts. The first he investigates is the 
“Armed Forces Special” #A1 of 27 October, which “gives detailed instructions as to how 
partisan and Hungarian armed forces should fight,”46 while also “fairly clearly implies 
that foreign aid will be forthcoming if the resistance forces succeed in establishing a 
“central military command.”47 Despite the obvious faults of the programs, Griffith states 
that had the program had been done in “theoretical terms without any reference to current 
events in Hungary,”48 then absolutely no policy would have been broken. Griffith goes 
on to say that probably the most serious fault of the broadcasts was the tone of the 
announcers, and that “too few writers appear willing to admit that the situation inside the 
country be so complex that they are not qualified to give listeners specific advice on what 
to do.”49
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 Griffith concludes that “there is no evidence in the 308 scripts read in this survey 
that the VFH [Voice of Free Hungary] could have incited the Hungarian Revolution- i.e., 
caused it to begin.”50 He also states that “The VFH (with one exception) made no direct 
promise or commitment of Western or UN military support or intervention. Its broadcasts 
may well, however, have encouraged Hungarians to have false hopes in this respect; they 
carefully did little or nothing to counteract them.”51
However, Griffith feels that the most regrettable mistake made by VFH was, 
 Even if just one program promised 
directly that the West would intervene, not to mention the countless inferring made in 
almost every program, it was done too many times. The Hungarian citizens were basing 
their entire uprising on the belief that they were not going to be in the fight alone, and the 
West left them to fight a hopeless battle.   
Not their relatively few policy violations, but their offense against the cannons of 
good political warfare and broadcasting technique. They delivered in a bombastic 
and imperative tone a message which could have been conveyed in the form of 
reports on and repetition of the information coming out of Hungary, particularly 
that from the Free Stations. The VFH told Hungarians things they either already 
knew or could not in any case have been taught the last minute by radio.52
 
 
Griffith states that the biggest mistake made by RFE in the months prior to and during the 
revolution was the tone in which stories were announced. The rhetoric included in the 
broadcasts and the direct instructions to fight were merely policy violations that were 
unfortunate to take place, but in no way aided to the fighting or inspired a nation to revolt. 
However, the false hope that seemed to be included in every broadcast is what was 
unacceptable. 
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Griffiths seems to be arguing that his broadcasts were viewed as propaganda by 
those in Hungary, and that there is no proof that they actually impacted the start of the 
Hungarian Revolution. All evidence that exists seems to suggest the contrary, that in fact 
the reports and broadcasts spewed over Radio Free Europe directly influenced the start of 
the revolution, and fueled it throughout its entirety. Somehow the United States was able 
to separate itself from RFE and received very little blame for the bloodshed that occurred. 
Throughout the propaganda barrage and even into the start of the Hungarian Revolution, 
it was clear that the United States was more worried about its foreign reputation than the 
outcome and impact that the revolution would have on the Hungarians. The CIA funded 
Radio Free Europe began its propaganda war by broadcasting messages of “freedom” 
from the west, encouraging non-cooperation with the Soviet Union. Somewhere along the 
line, the messages began to insight anger inside those listening in Hungary, and finally 
progressed into messages supporting and encouraging direct violent action to be taken 
against the Soviet Union. 
Many historians argue that Hungarians themselves didn’t believe the messages 
broadcast on air, but rather RFE was only effective in angering the Communist party. 
Instead, past historians believe that it was the policies of Stalinism, in particular the 
collectivization, rapid industrialization, loss of due process and political purges that took 
place. After a brief period of loosening up of policies after Stalin’s death, Imre Nagy 
spread a period of hope and improvements for the Hungarians. Historians argue that upon 
Nagy’s removal, Hungarians were angered and upset, and that directly led to the 
revolution. Even more common amongst historians is to view the Hungarian Revolution 
as the rise of freedom against an authoritarian regime. They view the Hungarians as the 
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underdogs who attempted to go against odds and try to fight for the freedom of their 
country. The revolution itself has often been viewed as a heroic event- democracy versus 
communism. The Hungarian Revolution was just a segment of the Cold War, not an 
individual event that cost nearly 4,500 innocent lives. The view that many historians have 
glorifies Western ideals rather than questioning how so many innocent lives were lost. 
The views of these historians are skewed, and their values bring into question the 
accuracy of their conclusions. Many of the early historians were active members in the 
revolution. Of those, most were outsiders, coming into the war zone from Western 
Europe or the United States. The only reason that they engaged in the fighting was 
because they were fighting for democracy against an authoritarian communist regime. It 
is impossible to expect these historians to present an unbiased, truthful representation 
about the impact that the democratic governments from the West might have had. Only 
recently have historians began to look at the impact that United States funded propaganda 
broadcast by RFE had on the revolution. 
RFE broadcast messages- created and approved by the CIA- sent messages of 
hope and inspiration to take arms and continue their fight against the Soviet Troops. The 
propaganda dragged on an event that never should have been started in the first place, and 
in the end thousands paid the ultimate price for RFE’s careless journalism. Instructions 
were given on military tactics and direct claims were made that the Soviet Union was 
retreating and victory was near, and yet RFE has received a free pass. Despite breaking 
some “minor” policies, RFE continued to broadcast into the region long after the 
revolution, and actually broadcasts in the Middle East today. The initial intent of RFE 
was to send unbiased news into the region, and Frank Winser manipulated the station to 
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the United States benefits. RFE and the United States should have received more blame 
for the unfortunate events that took place in October of 1956. 
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